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摘要
摘要
We know about our immediate environment - about the people, animals, and things around us - by having sensory perceptions. According to a tradition that traces back to Plato, we know about abstract reality - about mathematics, morality, and metaphysics - by having intuitions, which can be thought of as intellectual perceptions. The rough idea behind the analogy is this: while sensory perceptions are experiences that purport to, and sometimes do, reveal how matters stand in concrete reality by making us aware of that reality through the senses, intuitions are experiences that purport to, and sometimes do, reveal how matters stand in abstract reality by making us aware of that reality through the intellect. In this book, Elijah Chudnoff elaborates and defends such a view of intuition. He focuses on the experience of having an intuition, on the justification for beliefs that derives from intuition, and on the contact with abstract reality via intuition. In the course of developing a systematic account of the phenomenology, epistemology, and metaphysics of intuition on which it counts as a form of intellectual perception Chudnoff also takes up related issues such as the a priori, perceptual justification and knowledge, concepts and understanding, inference, mental action, and skeptical challenges to intuition.
目录
List of Figures | p. xi |
Introduction | p. 1 |
1 Intuition as Intellectual Perception | p. 1 |
2 Alternatives | p. 6 |
3 Intuition and the A Priori | p. 13 |
4 Plan of the Book | p. 17 |
Part I Intuition Experiences | |
1 What Intuitions are Like | p. 25 |
1.1 Perceptual Experiences | p. 27 |
1.2 Presentational Phenomenology | p. 32 |
1.3 Intuitions Are Seemings | p. 41 |
1.4 Intuitions Possess Presentational Phenomenology | p. 44 |
1.5 The Absent Intuition Challenge | p. 52 |
2 The Varieties of Intuition | p. 58 |
2.1 Preliminaries | p. 59 |
2.2 Intuition and Thought | p. 61 |
2.3 Intuition without Reflection | p. 70 |
2.4 Philosophical Intuitions | p. 76 |
Part II Intuitive Justification | |
3 Phenomenal Dogmatism | p. 83 |
3.1 Phenomenal Dogmatism about Perceptual Justification | p. 84 |
3.2 Phenomenal Dogmatism about Intuitive Justification | p. 93 |
3.3 Skepticism about Intuition | p. 98 |
4 Understanding-Based Reliabilism | p. 114 |
4.1 Understanding-Based Views of Intuitive Justification | p. 115 |
4.2 Problem Cases | p. 124 |
4.3 Assessing the Damage | p. 134 |
4.4 A Role for Understanding | p. 140 |
5 The Rational Roles of Intuition | p. 145 |
5.1 Intuitions as Justifiers and as Evidence | p. 146 |
5.2 Inferential Internalism | p. 148 |
5.3 Boghossian's Carrollian Argument | p. 153 |
5.4 Intuition in Action | p. 155 |
5.5 Objections and Elaborations | p. 163 |
5.6 The Ground of Intuitive Guidance | p. 165 |
Part III Intuitive Knowledge | |
6 The Ground of Perceptual Knowledge | p. 173 |
6.1 Phenomenology and the Ground of Perceptual Knowledge | p. 174 |
6.2 Gettier Cases | p. 181 |
6.3 The Alignment Problem | p. 194 |
6.4 Speckled Hens | p. 199 |
7 The Ground of Intuitive Knowledge | p. 204 |
7.1 Veridical Presentationalism about Intuitive Knowledge | p. 205 |
7.2 Dependence and Differentiation | p. 208 |
7.3 Intuitive Dependence | p. 211 |
7.4 Intuitive Differentiation | p. 217 |
7.5 The Ground of Intuitive Awareness | p. 223 |
Conclusion: Intellectual Perception Revisited | p. 226 |
Bibliography | p. 229 |
Index | p. 243 |