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摘要
摘要
Clausen was appointed as independent investigator of the events at Pearl Harbor by Secretary of War Stimson in 1944, and the present volume, co-authored with the late military historian Bruce Lee, is Clausen's riveting conclusion to his investigation, which he could not write when he presented his 800-page report to Stimson in 1945, for reasons of national security. Clausen definitively disproves the conspiracy theories about Pearl Harbor, explains why the Japanese attack was successful, and identifies those who were responsible for the American failure to protect itself. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
评论 (4)
出版社周刊评论
This book goes a long way toward ending the 50-year-old debate as to how the Japanese managed to surprise U.S. forces when they bombed Hawaii on December 7, 1941. In 1944, Secretary of War Henry Stimson selected co-author Clausen, then a lawyer in the U.S. Judge Advocate's office, to conduct an independent investigation into the Pearl Harbor attack; Clausen submitted a top-secret report on the matter, the substance of which is published here for the first time. Assisted by New York-based editor Lee, Clausen details his discovery of egregious errors of omission and commission, as well as criminal neglect of duty by the Army and Navy high command in Washington and Honolulu. He concludes that the top officers in Hawaii, General Walter Short and Admiral Husband Kimmel, were simply asleep at the switch and ignored repeated warnings. Probably the most telling factor in this failure of communication, he argues, was the Navy's arrogant hoarding of secret intelligence that should have been shared with its Army counterparts. This thoroughly engrossing narrative, as compelling as a detective novel, answers two major questions: What did Washington and Honolulu know about Japanese actions before the attack and what did they do about it? A significant historical breakthrough that should attract a wide readership. Photos. 60,000 first printing; BOMC, QPB and History Book Club alternate. ( Sept. ) (c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved
Kirkus评论
A riveting real-life detective story about one of the century's greatest controversies: the responsibility for America's shocking lack of preparedness at Pearl Harbor. Major (later Colonel) Clausen was appointed independent investigator into Pearl Harbor Henry Stimson in 1944, after it had been determined that the Army Pearl Harbor Board's reports had been based on tainted or perjured testimony. During his inquiry, Clausen traveled more than 55,000 miles and interviewed nearly one hundred Army, Navy, and civilian personnel, 30 of whom offered their accounts to no other investigators. His ace in the hole was a bomb- pouch, programmed to self-destruct if opened without authorization, that contained 40 top-secret cryptographic documents that Clausen used to lure the perjured witnesses into admitting their knowledge of ``Magic,'' the US process for intercepting and decoding Japan's diplomatic codes. Clausen's findings were classified top secret and censored to preserve national security and interservice harmony. Now, with coauthor Lee, who edited Gordon Prange's At Dawn We Slept (1981), Clausen convincingly debunks Pearl Harbor conspiracy theories that have spread like kudzu in works such as John Toland's Infamy (1982), and rebuts other accounts he regards as self- serving, (e.g., Edwin Layton's ``And I Was There''). Some of the best moments here come in cat-and-mouse legal confrontations, including one in which Clausen tripped up a colonel who almost doomed the career of General George Marshall. The Pearl Harbor debacle, Clausen concludes, resulted from several factors, including Admiral Husband Kimmel's hoarding of vital intelligence data from his Army counterpart, General Walter Short, and Short's failure to take necessary reconnaissance measures or use radar air- warning, preparing instead for an attack by sea. An essential document from one of the last players in a great military and legal drama. (Three eight-page b&w photo inserts--not seen.)
《书目》(Booklist)书评
"America still does not understand the facts behind the disaster of Pearl Harbor," insists Clausen, who indeed possesses the right to make such an assertion. He was appointed independent prosecutor by Secretary of War Henry Stimson in 1944 and charged with investigating the "root causes" of Pearl Harbor because, so the secretary believed, the official investigations had not discerned the truth. For seven months Clausen interviewed everyone involved in the U.S. armed forces and intelligence who might have been able to have some impact, large or small, on preventing the Japanese attack or at least lessening its result. But Stimson, when he received Clausen's report on his desk, deep-sixed it out of regard for national security; and only now, with his report having finally been declared declassified, can Clausen, with the help of coauthor Bruce Lee, relate the story of his investigation and what he found. Assigning various shades of blame to various quarters, including FDR's White House, Clausen sees the problem ultimately as being a failure of American intelligence at the time--not so much in the gathering of information as in its dissemination into appropriate hands. A bold book, sure to be snatched up by historian and general reader alike. ~--Brad Hooper
《图书馆杂志》(Library Journal )书评
By now everyone is aware that the worst of the Pearl Harbor tragedy might have been avoided if the United States had heeded the warnings more carefully and had had a little luck. Clausen adds to the picture by describing his high-level wartime mission to find the truth about the raid. Although he makes dramatic charges of laxness and organizational bungling, his overheated claims of outright malfeasance are neither new nor surprising. If the book adds little to the controversy, however, the wartime documents it reproduces make a useful addition to the Pearl Harbor literature. It is written in a fastidious, lawyerly fashion but is a nice supplement to Gordon Prange's classic At Dawn We Slept . Previewed in Prepub Alert, LJ 5/15/92; for other Pearl Harbor books, see ``The Day of Infamy in Print,'' LJ 9/1/91, p. 206-07.--Ed.-- Raymond L. Puffer, U.S. Air Force History Prog., Los Angeles (c) Copyright 2010. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.
目录
| Preface | p. ix |
| Acknowledgments | p. xvii |
| Foreword: Why I Wrote This Book | p. 1 |
| Background Documents | p. 10 |
| Chapter 1 "Leave No Stone Unturned" | p. 21 |
| Chapter 2 "Your Mission Is Impossible" | p. 35 |
| Chapter 3 "With Your Blessing, I'll Enlist" | p. 50 |
| Chapter 4 Who Was Telling the Truth? | p. 61 |
| Chapter 5 "Hostile Action Possible at Any Moment" | p. 83 |
| Chapter 6 "Put a Priority Tag on ..." | p. 102 |
| Chapter 7 "I Have Had to Barter Like a Rug Merchant" | p. 133 |
| Chapter 8 "It Was Understood ..." | p. 157 |
| Chapter 9 "No ... I Read a Novel" | p. 178 |
| Chapter 10 "It Was Customary and Expected" | p. 190 |
| Chapter 11 Not on Duty | p. 211 |
| Chapter 12 Sentries Who Failed | p. 222 |
| Chapter 13 Errors of Joint Command | p. 229 |
| Chapter 14 "Senator, ... the Purple Machine Was Ordered Destroyed" | p. 246 |
| Chapter 15 "They Just Quit" | p. 263 |
| Chapter 16 Final Judgement | p. 286 |
| Appendix | p. 313 |
| Exhibit B | p. 313 |
| Clausen Investigation Exhibit No. 7 | p. 313 |
| Clausen Investigation Exhibit No. 8 | p. 353 |
| Exhibit D | p. 394 |
| Information Made Available to General Short | p. 422 |
| The "Winds Code" | p. 447 |
| Index | p. 471 |