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摘要
摘要
With the Sokal hoax - the publication of a prominent physicist's pseudo-article in a leading journal of cultural studies - the status of science moved sharply from debate to dispute. Is science objective, a disinterested reflection of reality, as Karl Popper and his followers believed? Or is it subjective, a social construction, as Thomas Kuhn and his students maintained? This text adds to the argument, using evolutionary theory as a case study.
评论 (5)
出版社周刊评论
In a signal contribution to the debate about the nature of science, Ruse, a professor of philosophy and zoology at the University of Guelph, in Ontario, tackles a central question: Is science a report on objective reality with special standards of truth finding, as Austrian-born philosopher Karl Popper maintains, or is it a culturally bound enterprise, a sequence of paradigms that subjectively mirror our ever-shifting view of the world, as American physicist Thomas Kuhn insists? Ruse's intriguing answer, likely to satisfy no one fully, is that both Popper and Kuhn are correct. He uses evolutionary biology as a case study, starting with physician-poet Erasmus Darwin, a deist who regarded evolution as set in motion by a remote, nonintervening God, then moves on to grandson Charles Darwin, whose theories, according to Ruse, strongly reflected Victorian attitudes about progress, gender, race and capitalism, as well as Malthus's notion of the "struggle for existence." In a handsome, scholarly probe, Ruse argues that Richard Dawkins (The Selfish Gene) advances a "secular theology" rooted in 18th-century laissez-faire capitalism's belief that things work best when everybody is following his or her self-interest. Harvard sociobiologist Edward O. Wilson, in Ruse's view, replaced the religious fundamentalism of a Southern Baptist childhood with an ardent faith in what Wilson calls "the evolutionary epic," neo-Darwinism as a fertile "myth." And paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould's hotly contested theory of "punctuated equilibrium" owes a debt to Marxism (Gould's father was a Marxist) and to German idealism, in Ruse's analysis. Ruse's ultimate verdict: science remains embedded in cultural values, even as it improves its quest for objective knowledge. (Apr.) (c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved
Kirkus评论
Ruse (Philosophy and Zoology/Univ. of Guelf, Canada) poses a trendy question: Is evolution (indeed, is all science) a social construct, i.e., relative, subjective? Is it steeped in cultural values? If nothing else, readers are treated to lively profiles that pair the work and thoughts of Erasmus and Charles Darwin; Julian Huxley and Theodosius Dobzhansky; Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Dawkins; Richard Lewontin and Edward O. Wilson, and finally, the English sociobiologist Geoffrey Parker and the American Jack Sepkoski. Ruse weighs the contributions of each scientist on the scale of Popper (is there a belief in an objective real world out there that the science is approaching through hypotheses which are falsifiable?) vs. Kuhn (is the scientist engaged in science that is part of the group consensus, or is there a paradigm shift?). In parsing the work, Ruse comments on ``epistemic'' values'is the work coherent, consistent, with predictive validity, is it fertile in opening up new questions to research? Or is it nonepistemic'are there cultural (e.g., political, psychosocial) factors at work? Lest there be any angst, rest assured that Ruse concludes that there is objectivity in science'but there are also cultural factors at work; for instance, scientists may be religious or atheists. On the whole, Ruse emerges as a progressionist, in the sense that science has become more sophisticated, adhering to stricter rules of logic and evidence and eschewing speculations except in popular articles. All the same, one cannot avoid seeing selectivity and bias in Ruse himself: He is particularly hard on Gould. Lewontin, on the other hand, is given worshipful treatment in spite of his well-known use of Marxist dialectics even in his theoretical writing. And is there a bit of the white Western male fraternity in perpetuity here? Perhaps. In the end, Ruse's conclusions are sound enough. But expect some of his methods to be questioned and some of his subjects begging to differ. (12 photos, 18 line illustrations)
《书目》(Booklist)书评
In libraries where science and history of science circulate, this challenging but readable study of the nature of the scientific endeavor should have appeal. Ruse, a professor of philosophy and zoology, first sketches the visions of science of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn and then takes evolution as a case study, examining the careers and theories of Erasmus Darwin, Charles Darwin, Julian Huxley, Theodosius Dobzhansky, Richard Dawkins, Stephen Jay Gould, Richard Lewontin, Edward O. Wilson, Geoffrey Park, and Jack Sepkoski for indications of, on the one hand, scientific objectivity and, on the other, the influence of culture on the theories those scientists have championed. In addition to criticism of several generations of leading evolutionary scientists, Ruse offers a vital clarification of what is at issue in the "science wars," noting that the "reality" Popperian (and perhaps most) scientists seek to understand is reality versus illusion, rather than a definitive answer to the ancient philosophical question of realism versus nonrealism. --Mary Carroll
Choice 评论
For many years, Ruse has been a prolific writer on the history and philosophy of evolution (cf. Monad to Man: The Concept of Progress in Evolutionary Biology, 1996). His writing style stands midway between highly accessible science journalism and erudite, closely argued philosophy. Here he explores the question of whether evolutionary biology is socially constructed (Thomas Kuhn) or an approximation of reality (Karl Popper). He answers "yes" on both counts by delving into the biographies of the main spokesmen for evolutionary biology: Darwin, Huxley, Dobzhansky, Dawkins, Gould, Lewontin, Wilson, Parker, and Sepkoski. First of all, the book is valuable for its biographical content alone, as historical works of this magnitude are rare within the genre. Moreover, the constructivist-realist debate in the philosophy of science is often overly simplified by science journalists and overly complicated by erudite philosophers. Ruse, however, has written an important historical and philosophical book equally accessible to scholars, college students, and popular audiences. An outstanding contribution to the history and philosophy of evolution and highly recommended reading for scholars, college students, popular audiences, and local school boards interested in learning how science really works. General readers; undergraduates through professionals. R. F. White; College of Mount St. Joseph
《图书馆杂志》(Library Journal )书评
As its subtitle indicates, this book was prompted in part by the debate between the physicist Alan Sokal (Fashionable Nonsense, LJ 11/1/98) and post-modernist sociologists over whether science is mainly discovered or invented (constructed). Rather than another frontal attack on the post-modernists (although the Sokal debate is discussed at length in the prolog), this book is, instead, a thoughtful and fascinating survey of the many ways in which social concepts have affected evolutionary theory. Beginning with Erasmus Darwin, Darwin's grandfather, Ruse (Monad to Man: The Concept of Progress in Evolutionary Biology, LJ 11/15/96) provides a brilliant analysis of how ideas like progress and metaphors based on political and cultural theories and values have both helped and hindered the maturation of evolutionary theory into a true science. Most of the middle to late 20th-century scientists Russ deals with (including Stephen Jay Gould and E.O. Wilson) seem to have overcome their cultural biases and have produced relatively culture-free, or at least culture-independent, science. Nevertheless, the ways in which cultural metaphors continue to enrich their writings provides a fascinating study in the difficulty of producing truly epistemic (Ruse's term) evolutionary theory, free of any significant contamination by the value systems in which its developers are immersed. This is a thoroughly absorbing and important overview by an interesting and controversial philosopher. For academic and larger public libraries.ÄLloyd Davidson, Seeley G. Mudd Lib. for Science & Engineering, Northwestern Univ., Evanston, IL (c) Copyright 2010. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.
目录
Prologue: Science Wars | p. 1 |
1 Two Theories of Science | p. 13 |
2 From Fish to Philosopher | p. 37 |
3 On the Origin of Species | p. 54 |
4 Religion without Revelation | p. 81 |
5 Evolution Comes of Age | p. 100 |
6 Burying the Watchmaker | p. 122 |
7 Speaking Out for Paleontology | p. 135 |
8 Adaptation and Its Discontents | p. 153 |
9 Southern Baptist Meets Charles Darwin | p. 172 |
10 The Professional's Professional | p. 194 |
11 Crunching the Fossils | p. 214 |
12 Metaphors and Metavalues: Can Evolution Cut the Mustard? | p. 236 |
Epilogue: Terms of Engagement | p. 256 |
References | p. 259 |
Glossary | p. 276 |
Index | p. 287 |