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摘要
摘要
This book, based on Jaegwon Kim's 1996 Townsend Lectures, presents the philosopher's current views on a variety of issues in the metaphysics of the mind -- in particular, the mind-body problem, mental causation, and reductionism. Kim construes the mind-body problem as that of finding a place for the mind in a world that is fundamentally physical. Among other points, he redefines the roles of supervenience and emergence in the discussion of the mind-body problem. Arguing that various contemporary accounts of mental causation are inadequate, he offers his own partially reductionist solution on the basis of a novel model of reduction. Retaining the informal tone of the lecture format, the book is clear yet sophisticated.
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There are now quite a few high-powered philosophers contributing to a host of related debates in the philosophy of mind. None of them eclipses Kim (Brown Univ.) for originality, influence, clarity, or sheer philosophical penetration. This work brings together some central themes in Kim's works over the last few decades, focusing especially on problems of mental causation and reductionism, and does so in a crisp and eminently readable way. In terms of its philosophical integrity and insight, it is reminiscent of C.D. Broad's masterful The Mind and Its Place in Nature (1925), which Kim's compact book equals and in many ways excels. This book should be purchased by every academic library; and because of its uncommon accessibility, it will make a useful addition to the collections of large public libraries as well. All readership levels. C. J. Shields University of Colorado at Boulder
目录
Preface |
The Mind-Body Problem: Where We Now Are |
Supervenience, Realization, and Emergence |
Supervenience Is Not a Mind-Body Theory |
The Layered Model and Mereological Supervenience |
Physical Realizationism |
Physical Realizationism Explains Mind-Body Supervenience |
The Many Problems of Mental Causation |
Three Problems of Mental Causation |
The Problem of Anomalous Mental Properties |
The Problem of Extrinsic Mental Properties |
The Problem of Causal Exclusion |
The Supervenience Argument, or Descartes's Revenge |
Searle, Fodor, and the Supervenience Argument |
Block's Worries about Second-Order Properties |
Mental Causation: The Backlash and Free Lunches |
Unavoidability of Metaphysics: The Exclusion Problem |
Do Counterfactuals Help? |
"Program Explanation" and Supervenient Causation |
Does the Problem of Mental Causation Generalize? |
Properties: "Levels" and "Orders" |
Reduction and Reductionism: A New Look |
Nagel Reduction: Troubles with "Bridge Laws" |
The Functional Model of Reduction |
Functional Properties versus Functional Concepts |
Multiple Realization Again |
The Supervenience Argument Revisited |
The Options: Good News and Bad News |
Notes |
References |
Index |